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INTRODUCTION
European integration is the French Revolution of our time. Just as the French
Revolution set the agenda for modem political thought by bringing the people as the
constitution-founding subject onto the historical stage, so now European
supranational integration transnationalizes democracy and recasts the legitimacy
conditions of political action. In his recent work,' Jiirgen Habermas has put forth one
* Professor, Boston College Law School and Director, Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional
Democracy, Boston College. I received comments on previous drafts at the Prague Conference on Philos-
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Roundtable at Boston College. I thank Mattias Kumm, Kevin Gray, and Paulo Barrozo, for comments.
1. See generally JORGEN HABERMAS, THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: A RESPONSE (2012)
[hereinafter HABERMAS, CRISIS OF EU]; JORGEN HABERMAS, THE LURE OF TECHNOCRACY (Ciaran Cro-
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of the most elaborate and influential theories of supranational constituent power.2
Habermas argues that the great "innovation" of European integration is the
"complementary dependence and interconnection"' between the national and the
supranational levels of government. Nation-states survive the process of supranational
integration and coexist alongside the Union their citizens have created.!
According to this conception, the coexistence of member nation-states and the
European Union (EU) is reflected in a fundamental split in the identity of the
sovereign. Individuals are and see themselves both as peoples of nation-states and as
citizens of the EU.' In the first capacity, they are committed to their national polities
as "guarantors of the already achieved level of justice and freedom" against intrusions
and encroachments by an unfamiliar supranational polity.6 As EU citizens, theirs is a
project of transnationalizing democracy as a way of reconnecting the fragmented
politics of nation-states with the pressures of an increasingly interdependent world
society. Because neither identity is transient nor subordinate to the other,
transnationalized democracy is not democracy that has transcended, in the sense of
overcoming, the nation-state. Rather, Habermas's dual sovereignty thesis theorizes
the national and supranational levels as co-original and co-determinate. A choice
between them is neither necessary nor possible.
nin trans., 2015) (2013) [hereinafter HABERMAS, TECHNOCRACY]; Jurgen Habermas, Democracy in Eu-
rope: Why the Development of the EU into a Transnational Democracy Is Necessary and How It Is Possible,
21 EuR. L.J. 546 (2015) [hereinafter Habermas, Democracy in EuropeJ.
2. Scholars have long called for such an account "understood in the vocabulary of normative political
theory." Joseph H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: The European Court of Justice: Beyond 'Beyond' Doctrine' or the
Legitimacy Crisis of European Constitutionalism, in THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND NATIONAL COURTS -
DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT 365-66 (Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter et al. eds., 1998).
3. HABERMAS, CRISIS OF EU, supra note 1, at 27. This approach has been influential. See, e.g., Hauke
Brunkhorst, Europe in Crisis - An Evolutional Genealogy, in LAW AND THE FORMATION OF MODERN
EUROPE: PERSPECIVES FROM THE HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 308 (Mikael R. Madsen & Chris
Thornhill eds., 2014) (discussing the concept of evolution in a societal and constitutional context and relating
that framework to the dependence and interconnection between the national and supranational levels of
government within the EU).
4. See Habermas, Democracy in Europe, supra note 1, at 556 (analyzing the tension between the su-
pranational polity and its member states, and the gap in democratic legitimization of the EU).
5. See HABERMAS, CRISIS OF EU, supra note 1, at 35. See also Philip Allott, Epilogue: Europe and the
Dream of Reason, in EUROPEAN CONsTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE 202, 225 (Joseph H.H. Weiler
& Marlene Wind eds., 2003) (mentioning "one person" in the metaphysics of Europe's self-constituting).
6. HABERMAS, TECHNOCRACY, supra note 1, at 40.
7. As Habermas puts it, "[t]he globalization of commerce and communication, of economic production
and finance, of the spread of technology and weapons, and above all of ecological and military risks, poses
problems that can no longer be solved within the framework of nation-states or by the traditional methods
of agreement between sovereign states." JORGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES
IN POLITICAL THEORY 106 (Ciaran P. Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998) [hereinafter HABERMAS, THE
INCLUSION OF THE OTHER]. This is a plausible enumeration of the social conditions that might lead to
something akin to a "type-switch" in political organization. See GIANFRANCO POGGI, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE MODERN STATE: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 60 (1978) (studying "type-switch" between dif-
ferent types of states). Habermas is, of course, well aware that globalization does not fit as justification of
the early periods of integration, but he argues that "neither of the two original motives for integration [-
preventing war and containing Germany-are] a sufficient justification for pushing the European project
any further." Jtlrgen Habermas, Why Europe Needs a Constitution, 11 NEW LEFT REv. 5,7 (2001) [herein-
after Habermas, Constitution].
8. A rational reconstruction whereby EU citizens are part of the constituent power already challenges,
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
My aim here is to challenge, at the meta-level level that dual sovereignty occupies,
its specific terms of justifying constituent authority. I argue that it would be irrational
for individuals in their supranational capacity to accept the constituent process in the
terms laid out by the dual sovereignty thesis. While Habermas deserves credit for
reaffirming the importance of the concept of constituent power,9 and for introducing a
distinct account of supranational constituent power against the prevailing scholarly
view that questions the utility and normative appeal of such an account in the
European context,o the dual sovereignty thesis does not withstand close scrutiny. This
thesis builds on an asymmetry between the national and the supranational identities
that violates its own normative premises, specifically the principle that future citizens
of the Union and current citizens of the nation-states are equal subjects in their dual
role. By assuming that constitutional states are nation-states, the account under review
undercuts what Habermas himself identifies as the urgent task of using the republican
legacy of nation-states to devise mechanisms of democratic will-formation at the
supranational level. The implicit though unmistakable priority of the national versus
the supranational perspective ends up legitimizing the myriad ways in which nation-
states routinely undermine the project of European unification, in ways inconsistent
with dual sovereignty's own normative premises. Finally, the split political identity
itself becomes a source of fragmentation and dissonance that subverts the
transnationalization of democracy.
Beyond exposing tensions internal to the structure of the dual sovereignty thesis,
of particular interest is the claim that this account is reflected in the legal order of the
constituted European Union. Habermas advises that "we need only to draw the
correct conclusions from the unprecedented development of European law over the
or, depending on one's perspective, advances, traditional approaches. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, In Defence
of the Status Quo: Europe's Constitutional Sonderweg, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE
STATE 7, 9 (Joseph H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003) ("Europe's constitutional architecture has
never been validated by a process of constitutional adoption by a European constitutional demos and, hence,
as a matter of both normative political principles and empirical social observation the European constitu-
tional discipline does not enjoy the same kind of authority as may be found in federal states where federalism
is rooted in a classic constitutional order."). Habermas seems to agree with the latter part of the statement
regarding the difference between the European construct and typical federalism, including, prospectively,
the imperative of avoiding "normative subordination of states to the federal level." HABERMAS,
TECHNOCRACY, supra note 1, at 37. However, his dual sovereignty thesis rejects the argument about the
absence of a European citizenry (and thus a rationally reconstructed demos) as co-original with the peoples
of the nation-states. See HABERMAS, CRISIS OF EU, supra note 1, at 38 (claiming "[t]he division of the
constituent power divides sovereignty at the origin of a political community which is going to be consti-
tuted.... ").
9. The concept of constituent power, not only its contours but its very usefulness, has been contested
as unnecessary to legality-centered approaches. See, e.g., David Dyzenhaus, Constitutionalism in an Old
Key: Legality and Constituent Power, 1 GLOBAL CONST. 229, 229 (2012) (arguing against the analysis of
constituent power in legal and constitutional theory). For helpful recent studies of constituent power, see
generally THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM
(Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2008).
10. Chris Thornhill, Contemporary Constitutionalism and the Dialectic of Constituent Power, 1 GLOBAL
CONST. 369, 373 (2012) (noting that "the absence of a traditional constituent power has haunted research
on the public legal order of the EU from its inception until today."). See also Nico Krisch, Pouvoir Constitu-
ant and Pouvoir Irritant in the Postnational Order, 14 INT'L J. CONST. L. (I-CON) 657 (noting that interna-
tional responses to the domestic challenge of theorizing about constituent power have failed to advance
visions of a regional or global constituent power that, in the particular European context, might be norma-
tively appealing but would not find support in societal and political practices).
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past half-century."n While philosophy's turn to law is compelling as ever 2 , the
question remains which specific interpretation of European constitutionalism is at
work here. Habermas's account places municipal and supranational legal orders
alongside one another in a relation of heterarchical coordination that is incompatible
with hierarchical subordination of (any) one order to the other. I believe that
conception of European constitutionalism, while prevalent, has important limitations.
The principles of European constitutionalism call for a more nuanced, and at times
altogether different, interpretation of European constitutional doctrine than either the
dual sovereignty thesis or related constitutional theories are able to offer. Perhaps
most regrettable of all is that, having set out to reject the "hopeless alternative""
between nation-states and a European federation, the dual sovereignty thesis ill-serves
Habermas's vision of a European Union whose peoples are the true masters of the
Treaty" and whose supranational project answers the need for more abstract forms of
social integration of the kind that the political self-constitution of 'higher freedom"'
requires under an interdependent world society. Habermas rejects a supranational
federation for lack of popular support, much like Kant rejected a world state in
Perpetual Peace." But, unlike Kant's conception, which has the internal resources to
overcome the shortcomings of its initial formulation," Habermas's account casts in
stone a state of European affairs that is, by his own account, fluid.
11. HABERMAS, CRISIS OF EU, supra note 1, at x.
12. The focus on the European legal system, and especially its constitutional dimension, provides access
to the structural features of European integration that the daily ebb and flow of ordinary politics oftentimes
obscures. See generally Christian Joerges, Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and the Role of
Law in the Process of European Integration, 2 EUR. L.J. 105 (1996) (exploring legal analysis of European
integration needed to supplement political analysis). See also JOHN P. MCCORMICK, WEBER, HABERMAS,
AND THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN STATE 14 (2007) ("Attention to the law has been the
most effective way of grasping the several transformations of state, society, and economy in the modem
epoch despite the differences among the discrete eras contained within it."). However, the prominence of
the ECJ, as part of the constituted powers, has generally been seen as an obstacle for thinking about con-
stituent power in the EU. As Chris Thornhill puts it, its version of "judicial constituent power" has "revived
long-suppressed memories of deep hostility to judicial norm setting, which inhered in the origins of modem
European constitution making." Chris Thornhill, The European Constitution and the Pouvoirs Constituants:
No Longer, or Never, Sui Generis?, in SELF-CONSTITUTION OF EUROPEAN SOCIETY: BEYOND EU
POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNANcE 13,14 (Jiff PFiboit ed., 2016).
13. HABERMAS, CRISIS OF EU, supra note 1, at ix.
14. See generally HABERMAS, TECHNOCRACY, supra note 1.
15. See Alexander Somek, Constituent Power in National and Transnational Contexts, 3 TRANSNAT'L
LEGAL THEORY 31, 33 (2012) (pointing out that constituent power "emerges only in a philosophical context
in which questions of legitimacy or authority are ultimately debated as matters of freedom.").
16. See Jtirgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalization of
International Law, 23 EuR. J. INT'L L. 335,338 (2012) ("For a long time, the dense network of supranational
organizations has aroused fears that the connection between civil rights and democracy assured by the na-
tion-state is being dissolved and that the democratic sovereign is being dispossessed by executive powers
operating independently at the global level.").
17. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), reprinted in KANT: POLITICAL
WRITINGS (Hans Reiss ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 1970).
18. By this I mean that the normative principles underlining Kant's account, specifically his conception
of republican constitutions, can be used to fill in the gaps of Kant's limited institutional vision for perpetual
peace. See Vlad Perju, Cosmopolitanism in Constitutional Law, 35 CARDOzO L. REv. 711, 741-46 (2013)
(arguing that Kant's conception of republican constitutions is used to bolster his limited institutional vision
for perpetual peace).
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I. DUAL SOVEREIGNTY: SPLIT POLITICAL IDENTITY
The split political identity pulls dual sovereignty in opposing directions: in the
particular direction of specific nation-states and in the general direction of the regime-
type (constitutional state) to which these nation-states belong. The question is this:
How does the dual sovereignty thesis straddle this tension?
Recall that Habermas conceptualizes individuals as citizens of the already
constituted nation-states and the (same) individuals as citizens of the to-be-constituted
European Union as subjects that coexist within the divided identity of individual
sovereigns." These two roles are of equal standing and the conflicts between the
identities related to each role cannot be resolved through structural rules that would
prioritize one identity over the other. 20 Harmonization processes within individual
identity must respect and reinforce the equality of the constituent parts, which, in
Habermas's view, rules out hierarchy. 21 But, since the political and psychological
foundations of democratic self-government require predictable and reliable stability,
harmonization cannot result from accidental, and thus essentially fleeting, overlaps of
interests; rather, it must rest on rational grounds.2
What, then, are the rational grounds for individuals' attachment to their nation-
states? Habermas's answer carries all the baggage of the unresolved tensions of this
theory of constitutional patriotism, 23 only heightened now by the more fundamental
perspective from constituent authority. His answer, in a nutshell, is that nation-states
19. Habermas, supra note 16, at 342-43 ("Article 1(1) of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Eu-
rope refers to both subjects, the 'citizens' and the 'states' of Europe. Even though this constitution drawn
up by a convention in 2004 was never adopted, the Lisbon Treaty currently in effect supports the thesis that
sovereignty is 'shared' between citizens and states . . . .") (citations omitted). Thus, the two subjects coexist
within the divided identity of individuals who exercise their constituent power. Id. at 343 ("Citizens are
involved on both sides within the higher-level political community - directly in their role as Union citizens,
and indirectly in their role as citizens of the Member States."). This conception shares a family resemblance
but is rather different from earlier theories of dual sovereignty, which became prominent in the German
constitutional thought as an attempt to theorize the constitutional form of the Holy Roman Empire. Re-
sponding to that particular context, the seventeenth century conception distinguished the personal rights of
the holders of sovereignty (maiestas personalis) from the maiestas realis, as the property of the whole state.
The HobbesianlBodinian conception of sovereignty countered the dualist approaches by emphasizing the
unitary nature of sovereignty. See generally DANIEL LEE, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN EARLY MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT (2016), for more on this debate.
20. Id.
21. Such harmonization poses difficult questions about timing, method and outcome. Habermas says
little to clarify these matters other than to point out that "[f]rom the perspective of democratic theory, the
agreement by the two sides to cooperate in founding a constitution opens up a new dimension." Habermas,
Democracy in Europe, supra note 1, at 556. But, since this new dimension also does not allow for hierar-
chical prioritization, the conflicts between the constitutive parts and the ensuing need for harmony is simply
replicated at that new dimension.
22. While this need not imply the exclusivity of rational grounds, it does mean that, as Jan-Werner Mill-
ler has put it, "cognitive elements will predominate." Jan-Werner Mtiller, A General Theory of Constitu-
tional Patriotism, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. (I-CON) 72, 86 (2008). Furthermore, the need to stabilize split iden-
tity requires that the cognitive elements be even more predominant in the case of dual political identity than
under Habermas's general account of constitutional pluralism, which posited a unitary self.
23. Habermas formulates that account in multiple works. See HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE
OTHER, supra note 7, at 105-27; Habermas, Constitution, supra note 7, at 7. See generally JORGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996) [hereinafter, HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS].
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must be seen as constitutional states, that is, statist political formations that have been
the sites for unprecedented normative accomplishments formulating and securing the
freedom and equality of their members and whose political practices and institutional
structures reflect the entrenched lessons of processes of collective learning that have
made those accomplishments possible.24 The next sections take up the normative
makeup of the constitutional state. Here I address the centrality of the regime-type to
the dual sovereignty thesis.
Conceptually, it is possible to distinguish between a normative core common to
all constitutional states and the particulars of one's own nation-state. But how do
individuals, in their capacity as citizens of their nation-states, distinguish between the
republican and the particularistic dimensions of their nation-states? Put differently,
how do they have access to the normative core of the constitutional state in a way that
can be separated from the particular form that normative core takes in the cultural-
historical circumstances of their own nation-state? One option is to envisage citizens
possessing a version of political literacy whereby they are able to reflect on the
historical development of the state as a form of political organization, strive to separate
historical contingency from normative principle, and place their attachment with
"the"-as opposed to "their" -constitutional state. What complicates this process is
the issue of identity attachment. Since the preservation of nation-states applies to
particular, nationally-bounded political communities, individuals as members of these
nation-states have, and presumably share among themselves, a sense of the worth and
accomplishments of their specific political community. They can be rationally
committed to the deep principles of the constitutional state, as a result of
understanding that those normative accomplishments have not been preconditioned
by the functional process of securing the foundations of social integration, but rather
have resulted from slow and intricate learning process that have been constitutive of
one among a number of evolutionarily available types of social integration.
Simultaneously, however, individuals are attached to the specific embodiment of those
principles in time and space, within each particular political community. As members
of nation-states, individuals want to bring to the process of European integration the
specific ways in which their cultures and traditions give meaning to the general
principles of the constitutional state.' They expect European integration not to
endanger their polity's ability to live by its specific interpretation, which is part of their
national political identity. The dual sovereignty approach seems compatible, indeed
premised, on at least a modicum of national specificity.2 6
But Habermas is understandably uneasy with some of the implications of this
approach. While the tension between particularism and universalism is built-into the
very concept of the nation-state2 7, and to that extent unavoidable within its confines,
24. See HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 23, at 290-95, for Habermas's discussion of norma-
tive models of democracy.
25. HABERMAS, CRISIS OF EU, supra note 1, at 42.
26. This is a compelling interpretation of Habermas's earlier account of constitutional patriotism. See
Frank Michelman, Morality, Identity and "Constitutional Patriotism", 14 RATIO JuRIS 253, 253-55 (2001)
(characterizing Habermas's account of constitutional patriotism in the terms of the political community's
concrete-rather than abstracted-ethical character).
27. HABERMAS, The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship, in
HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER, supra note 7, at 115 ("The tension between the universalism
of an egalitarian legal community and the particularism of a community united by historical destiny is built
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the dual sovereignty thesis seeks not to replicate the tension into the internal dynamic
of the constituent power at the European level. Individuals are committed to their
nation-state qua constitutional state." Valuing instead the concrete historical nation-
state would be to confuse "the principles of the constitutional state ... with one of its
context-bound historical modes of interpretation."2 9 One problem with particularism
is that it distracts from the emphasis on individuals as ultimate sovereigns." When
political identity attaches itself to the preservation of the culture of a particular
community, there is a risk of a shift away from the individuals to the collective of that
political community. The risk is, of course, greater when social integration is premised,
as it has been throughout much of German modern history, on an ethnic conception
of political membership. But the risk is present even outside of that context, at least
from the perspective of the individuals themselves, concerned as they must be with
distinguishing the transcendent, or universalizing, core of the constitutional state from
the particular cultural form around which they as citizens have clustered around their
collective political community.
It is unclear if dual sovereignty has the capacity to mitigate or even to gauge this
risk. The difficulty comes from the preservation of the national political culture, which
is part of the territory of preserving the attachment of individuals to their nation-states.
In that capacity, individuals are part of political communities that presumably are
sufficiently distinct from other political communities. Their continuing attachment to
their nation-states signals their justified desire to preserve that difference, as reflected
in the normative accomplishments of their particular states. To be sure, people do not
lose their individual identity by virtue of belonging to a particular community, or else
they could never be the dual sovereigns that Habermas posits them to be. But it is
nevertheless true that there can be no guarantee that the lens of constitutional culture,
even in forms that are meant to be non-naturalistic, will not be totalizing. And such a
lens distracts from constitutional principle. Even when forms of culture develop
originally as specific interpretations within a political community of abstract principles
of self-government, a focus on the particular nation-states risks obscuring their origins
as derivative from those normative principles. From that point on there is only one
small step across the Rubicon - itself a rather shallow river - since such identitarian
versions of collective-based argument coming perilously close to nationalism. It is the
specter of nationalism in its myriad pathological forms that explains Habermas's
rejection of particularism. The question, however, is not if the risks posed by
nationalism are real but rather if the dual sovereignty thesis has the resources to
eliminate or mitigate them.
into the very concept of the national state.").
28. See id. at 254 (explaining Habermas's assertion that national identity derives from the community's
attachment to idealized but sometimes counterfactual notions about their constitution).
29. HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 23, at 250 (critiquing Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde).
This process of abstraction is similar in nature to the process that led to the formation of nation-states. See
Habermas, Constitution, supra note 7, at 16 (arguing that the "emergence of national consciousness involved
a painful process of abstraction, leading from local and dynastic identities to national and democratic
ones ..... .
30. See Bernard Yack, Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism, 29 POL. THEORY 517, 530 (2001) (con-
trasting popular sovereignty as a creature of the people with cultural particularism, which has its roots in
community identities).
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I have suggested that a particular challenge comes from the particularism
lurking behind a core assumption of dual sovereignty, namely the assumption that the
constitutional state must be a nation-state. To argue, as Habermas does, that
individuals as members of their nation-states want the preservation of their state
formations in order to hold onto the normative accomplishments of the constitutional
state is to assume that those normative accomplishments are parasitic upon the
political form of the nation-state. That "the democratic-constitutional structure [of
the nation-state] continue to exist intact in the future Union"3 ' becomes the sine qua
non condition for attaining the normative goals. The European Union, which is not
and will never become a nation-state, cannot by implication be a constitutional state.32
It is quite surprising that the dual sovereignty thesis should stipulate that
impossibility. In fact, one might have defined the problematique facing individuals qua
bearers of constituent authority as whether, and under what conditions, social
integration can take place in a politically integrated Europe in ways that can secure
and replicate, at unprecedentedly high levels of abstraction, the normative
accomplishments of nation-states. Can a united Europe be the functional equivalent
of a constitutional state? Does a unified Europe provide the political form in which
freedom and equality can be secured under conditions of globalization, just as the
nation-state provided the political form for freedom and equality under conditions of
industrialization and modernization? These questions take on even greater.urgency
when the burden on the individuals qua citizens of the EU is defined as setting the
conditions under which the Union can become a supranational constitutional state as
the only means for preserving the normative accomplishments secured by the nation-
state over the past two centuries.
It is telling that Habermas does not discuss, in this context, the possibility of the
EU as a supranational constitutional state. One concern is, presumably, that the
possibility by itself could undermine dual identity as a core tenet of dual sovereignty.
If the normative accomplishments of nation-states qua constitutional states could be
protected at the supranational level, then, as far as constituent power is concerned, the
task for individuals qua citizens of the EU will be to work out the normative
parameters of that protection. Whatever shape they give to those parameters, shifting
the center of gravity to the supranational level risks emptying the political identity of
citizens as members of their nation-states of an agenda. Bereft of such normative
content, the national political identity would be vulnerable to replacement by the
"overwhelming"3 3 supranational political project.' That, of course, is not to imply that,
31. Habermas, Habermas, Democracy in Europe, supra note 1, at 554.
32. Far from outlandish, this possibility has been part of the long and venerable tradition of theorizing
the constitutional nature of the European Union. Many scholars of European integration have argued that
the EU is in the process of becoming, and thus has the capacity to become, a state. See generally G. Federico
Mancini, Europe: The Case for Statehood, 4 EUR. L. J. 29 (1998) (detailing scholarly arguments that the EU
is in the process of becoming a state). For a more recent and comprehensive argument, see generally GLYN
MORGAN, THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN SUPERSTATE: PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION AND EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION (2007) (detailing a more recent and comprehensive argument in support of a European su-
perstate). But see Neil Walker, Constitutional Pluralism Revisited, 22 EUR. L. J. 333, 344 (2016) (arguing
that "[p]roponents of the federalist version of the EU have long insisted that the appropriate form of federal
compact for the EU is not a European federal state.").
33. HABERMAS, TECHNOCRACY, supra note 1 at 40.
34. This is an understandable concern, at least so long as one accepts its underlying model of political
identity formation. The model, which underpins the German Constitutional Court's Maastricht decision,
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under such a scenario, national political form itself would disappear. The lesson of
history is that higher forms of integration subsume but need not displace lower forms
of integration, so here the supranational political form itself would entirely displace
national political form. But national political forms would become hierarchically
integrated within a vertical structure of authority.
A central concern of Habermas's own thinking about European integration,
which dovetails uneasily with his dual sovereignty thesis, is to theorize the conditions
for the Union becoming a political space where communicative processes transcend
national boundaries and where it can be shown how democracy could discipline the
forces of the market by creating a universe of intersubjectively shared meanings." Just
as the nation-state created, at its particular moment in history, the conditions of
legitimacy for processes of democratic will-formation that reversed social
disintegration, so a supranational constitutional state could perform a similar task
under the conditions of post-war European integration. If it is possible to
conceptualize the task of the individuals qua citizens of the EU at the constitutive
moment along these lines, it becomes difficult to defend the assumption the EU cannot
be a constitutional state, and its corollary that nation-states must be preserved or else
their normative accomplishments would be endangered.
II. DUAL SOVEREIGNTY: NATIONAL VERSUS SUPRANATIONAL
The previous section has identified unresolved tensions around this split political
identity with implications for the dual sovereignty thesis. Consider, as an entry point
into the next step of the analysis, its temporal implications. According to the dual
sovereignty thesis, individuals seek the "conservation of the normative substance that
their national democracies already historically embody."" One temporal dimension
of their judgment is retrospective; it focuses on the preservation of what states have
"already achieved."3 7 This claim is not historical in nature38 , as it is implausible to refer
to nation-states such as Germany or Italy at the EU's constitutive moment as guardians
of freedom whose normative accomplishments ought to be preserved.3 ' The claim is,
assumes that identity-formation boils down to an all-or-nothing game of allocation of competencies. The
aim of the German judges on that occasion was to protect and preserve national political identity. But one
could flip the priorities and instead allocate competencies to the supranational level. While Habermas's
position on matters of identity formation is characteristically complex, there are indications of his sympathy
for this model. See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, THE POST-NATIONAL CONSTITUTION AND THE FUTURE OF
DEMOCRACY 77 (1998) ("But to remain a source of solidarity, the status of citizenship has to maintain a
use-value: it has to pay to be a citizen, in the currency of social, ecological, and cultural rights as well.").
35. HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER, supra note 7 at 125.
36. Id. at 556.
37. Id. at 554.
38. For a discussion about the normative and the sociological dimensions of a theory of constituent
power, see Mattias Kumm, Constituent Power, Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism, and Post-Positivist Law, 14
Int'l J. Const. L. 697 (2016). See also Neil Walker, The Return of Constituent Power: A Reply to Mattias
Kumm, 14 Int'l J. Const. L. 906 (2016),
39. If anyone's memory needs to be refreshed, Friedrich Reck's diary is a good place to start. See
FRIEDRICH RECK-MALLECZEWEN, DIARY OF A MAN IN DESPAIR (Paul Rubens trans., Duckworth Liter-
ary Entm't 2000). And, while at it, consider the following rumination, dated October 1940: "The idea of a
united Europe was not always upheld by me, but I know now that we can no longer afford the luxury of
considering it a mere idea. Europe must either make any further wars impossible, or this cradle of great
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rather, one of rational reconstruction.' Individuals as holders of popular sovereignty
are rational actors whose motivations are retrospectively reconstructed to demand the
preservation of what they, through collective learning processes, know to be within the
realm of their nation-states' normative potential.
The temporal dimension of this reconstruction is complex. Judgments about the
accomplishments of the nation-state are judgments that, even when rationally
reconstructed, occur by definition at the moment in time when political authority is
being constituted. The dual sovereignty thesis is about the co-original nature of the
double moment of constituting power. However strong the impulse to compress
historical duration, the moment at which power is constituted is an inflection in time
that cannot be extended indefinitely. Concessions to temporality come with the
territory of constituent power. 41 This reveals the dual temporality of the judgment of
individuals as citizens of nation-states about the preservation of the constitutional
state. In addition to the retrospective embrace of the normative accomplishments of
the constitutional state, individuals also prospectively anticipate, first, that those
accomplishments could be endangered at the supranational level and, second, that, if
protected from such threats, nation-states could remain a site where past
accomplishments could be at least preserved, if not even amplified.42
The difficulty with this view is not temporality as such.4 3 Rather, it is the
asymmetry of normative expectations in the construction of dual political identity.
The asymmetry is between how individuals as citizens of their nation-states relate to
their states, and how individuals qua citizens of the EU relate to that political
construct. Specifically, in this conception, individuals assume the best about what their
states are and will remain -namely, guarantors of the level of justice and freedom, as
well as political sites that foster solidarity." At the same time, they assume that the
ideas will see its cathedrals pulverized, and its landscape turned into a plain." Id. at 124.
40. It has been argued that this type of retrospective reconstruction is a common feature of contempo-
rary accounts of constituent power. See Krisch, supra note 10, at 660 (arguing that constituent power today
"operates through the-retroactive-attribution of acts to a socially constructed collective self."). Such is,
unsurprisingly, the style of normativist approaches to constituent power. See Martin Loughlin, The Concept
of Constituent Power, 13 EUR. J. POL. THEORY 218,221-231 (2014) (describing the normativist approach to
constituent power, and comparing it to decisionism as well as to the author's preferred approach, relation-
alism).
41. Hans Lindahl identifies the same feature but embraces the paradox. See Lindahl, The Paradox of
Constituent Power: The Ambiguous Self-Constitution of the European Union, 20 RATIO JURIS 485, 496
(2007) ("The 're' of representation does not refer to what supervenes or follows an original present and
presence, a 'now' in which a community constitutes itself as a community in the plenitude of a simple pres-
ence to itself. Instead, and paradoxically, an act originates a community through the representation of its
origin.")
42. See generally Frank Schimmelfennig, The Normative Origins of Democracy in the European Union:
Towards a Transformationalist Theory of Democratization, 2 EUR. POL. SCI. REv. 211 (2010).
43. The temporal aspects of constituent power have been the object of scholarly reflection. See, e.g.,
Somek, supra note 15, at 35-36 (discussing the temporality of constituent power: "[a] successful act of con-
stitution is possible only if successive acts engage with one another ... The intertwinement of acts is possible
if those finding themselves confronted with the expectation to act as members of a collective body 'retroac-
tively' come to accept this attribution 'by exercising the powers granted to them by a constitution."). See
also Markus Patberg, Constituent Power Beyond the State: An Emerging Debate in International Political
Theory, 42 MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 224, 231 (identifying retrospective and prospective ascriptions as
part of the normative dimension of constituent power).
44. See Habermas, Democracy in Europe, supra note 1, at 553-54 (discussing European citizens' inter-
est in forming a supranational polity conflicting with interest in having their nation-states remain guarantors
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supranational union cannot become a primary site within which any such guarantees
could be secured. This reflects a significant asymmetrical preference for nation-states
over the supranational Union.4 5
It is not altogether surprising that the dual sovereignty thesis provides no
justification for this asymmetry. Facing this tension would raise concerns over how
rational it is for individuals as citizens of the EU to participate in the constituent
process in the terms laid out by the dual sovereignty thesis. The effect of the
asymmetry of normative expectations is to introduce a structural rule of priority that
violates the premise of equality between the two sovereigns.' But how rational is it
for individuals in their supranational capacity to accept that role? Their participation
seems rational if the task they set for themselves at the moment of the origin of the
political community that is going to be constituted is to work out how the European
Union can preserve the accomplishments of the constitutional state. But, as we have
already seen, that task conceivably makes the nation-state dispensable and thus
undercuts the necessary duality of sovereignty.
Suppose, however, that it is possible to justify the asymmetry of political
expectations on prudential, rather than normative, grounds. Those grounds are the
"conservation of the normative substance that our national democracies already
historically embody."47 Since it cannot be definitively shown that similar
accomplishments can be delivered at the supranational level, and nor can it be doubted
that a similar level has not been reached at the supranational level, it is simply prudent
to protect the existent accomplishments of the nation-stated.4 With the hard-fought
accomplishments of the constitutional state on the line, risk-aversion demands holding
fast to national identity.4 9
Dismantling this claim will require a more thorough investigation of just what
Habermas believes are the normative accomplishments of the constitutional state.
Before proceeding to that analysis, it is worth pausing over to piece together the
internal structure of Habermas's argument. First, a particular historical moment in the
development of European integration is selected. Then accomplishments of the
nation-state are identified, with comparatively little in-depth analysis of failures and
atrocities perpetrated by those state formations both within and outside their
sovereign jurisdictions. Further, the normative accomplishments for which the nation-
state is given full credit are considered in a context from which everything else is
obscured, including the role of supranational integration in securing those
accomplishments. The dual sovereignty thesis takes the dynamic of that moment-a
of the level of justice and freedom already achieved).
45. This is similar to debates about judicial review whose supporters assume the best about courts and
the worse about legislatures. For a discussion and critique of asymmetries in that context, see generally
Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
46. See id. at 552 (explaining the lack of trust between European nations for a European superstate as
an insistence of self-conscious citizens on the normative achievements of their respective nation-states).
47. Id. at 556.
48. See id. at 553 (discussing a well-founded interest of self-conscious citizens in their nation-states not
being exposed to the risk of intrusions and encroachments by an unfamiliar supranational polity).
49. See, e.g., ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY
89-96 (1991) (discussing the rise of the cult of the British Constitution in response to revolutions in France,
especially the general aversion of the educated class to any extension of the franchise in favor of permanent
fixture of constitutional order restricting suffrage).
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questionable interpretation of a moment that, in world-historical terms, is fleeing-to
provide sufficient ground for theorizing the normative dynamic between the national
and supranational levels and, through it, the transnationalization of democracy in
Europe. Underlying this problematic method is the need for stability, by itself
unsurprising given the inherent instabilities of dual identity, and the willingness to
meet that need by ascribing stabilizing traits to an artificially depoliticized status quo.o
The price, however, will be steep. It will come as a reversal of equality between the
dual identities on which the dual sovereignty thesis is premised. The reversal takes the
form of implicitly prioritizing the attachment to one's national political community
over supranational identity, thus undermining the latter's viability and stability. Even
more importantly, the reversal fails to acknowledge the new institutional forms that
the protection of higher freedom may now require.
III. RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE
The philosophical core of dual sovereignty aims to protect the normative make-
up of the constitutional state. Habermas rejects the hierarchical subordination of the
national structure to the European supranational structure as compromising the
normative integrity of nation-states, and specifically the political institutions and
communicative processes that have been established around a particular kind of
collective self-determination." European nation-states are constitutional democracies
of a certain type. The European Sozialstaat gives institutional expression to a
particular understanding of political freedom where "no one is free as long as the
freedom of one person must be purchased with another's oppression."52 Therein rest
the normative anchors of practices of mutual recognition and of material redistribution
whose cumulative effect is the creation of the social solidarity that allows individuals
the benefit of the "fair value" of their rights.53 Social solidarity is the hard-fought result
of protracted and painful learning processes that take place within the institutional and
normative framework of nation-states. Those accomplishments-the "free and
relatively equitable and socially secure living conditions""-would be at risk of
dissolving if the social texture that underpins the constitutional state caved under the
pressure of global markets."
50. This is similar to the mistake for which Habermas chastises authors who failed to decouple state
sovereignty and popular sovereignty, namely the mistake of "overgeneraliz[ing] a contingent historical con-
stellation and obscur[ing] the artificial, and thus floating, character of the consciousness of national identity
constituted in nineteenth-century Europe." HABERMAS, CRISIS OF EU, supra note 1, at 16-17.
51. See id. (discussing the collective practice of participating in democratic election transforming into
decisions of a collective only in a distributively general sense, making popular sovereignty a mirror image
of state sovereignty only through a reifying singularization of pluralistic processes of opinion- and will-for-
mation).
52. HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 23, at 418 (emphasis in original).
53. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 5-6 (1996) (referring to Rawls's first principle of justice:
A guarantee that political liberties to all citizens are secured because they are equal in the sense that every-
one has a fair opportunity to hold public office and to influence the outcome of political decisions).
54. Habermas, Democracy in Europe, supra note 1, at 553.
55. For a formulation from the perspective of systems theory, see Hauke Brunkhorst, The European
Dual State: The Double Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and the Need for Re-Politicization,
in SELF-CONSTITUTION OF EUROPEAN SOCIETY: BEYOND EU POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNANCE 239,244
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This approach has two component parts. One part involves the role of rights in
a political community's project of democratic self-determination; the other concerns
the question of the fair value of those rights. I discuss the first aspect here and take up
the question of fair value, with its implications about social solidarity and material
redistribution, in the next section.
"Who, if not nation-states, would guarantee equal rights for all citizens on their
territories"", Habermas asks, marking the irreplaceability of state political formations.
Yet, rhetoric should not obscure complexities. Consider first the nature and role of
rights, drawing from Habermas's own body of work. Rights are not only shields or
swords through which individuals relate with the institutions of their constitutional
democracy. They are also repositories of the lessons learned during that democracy's
hard-fought struggles for recognition." Consider the transnational aspect to how those
repositories come into existence. Habermas, who is not a methodological nationalist,
conceptualizes constitutional democracies not as closed to one another but rather as
interlocked in a process of mutual co-dependence." Normative forces internal to
constitutional states make constitutional developments in each jurisdiction relevant to
the experiences of self-government of other jurisdictions. For instance, the duty of
responsiveness that constitutional states owe to their individuals as sovereigns requires
that political institutions set in place mechanisms that provide clear channels of
communication between the state and its citizens. 9 Transjurisdictional mutual co-
dependence is part of those constitutional mechanisms of self-correction. Given their
common political commitment to the creation of free communities of equals,
constitutional orders that stand alongside one another are a repertoire of normative
frameworks within which different dimensions of common commitments -equality,
autonomy, dignity-are revealed and can be explored. The experiences in self-
government of other political communities can reveal dimensions of these values that
discrete historical developments oftentimes obscure. In practice, of course, questions
of institutional capability and technological prowess, among others, determine the
modalities and extent of inter-systemic communication. But, the point is that the
openness of constitutional orders to one another is not contingent. It is, rather,
anchored in the very normative core of the constitutional state.
As they relate to one another, constitutional orders must account for variations
in how each jurisdiction interprets shared normative commitments. The French
(Jiff Pfibdit ed., 2016) (discussing the need to prevent the "usurpation of the constituent power by the eco-
nomic system" at the supranational level (emphasis omitted)). Concerns about how "executive federalism"
undermines political self-government are among the primary motivation for Habermas's transnationaliza-
tion of popular sovereignty. See HABERMAS, CRISIS OF EU, supra note 1, at viii (identifying the threat that
the kind of "executive federalism of a self-authorizing European Council . .. would provide the template
for a post-democratic exercise of political authority.").
56. JURGEN HABERMAS, EUROPA: VISION UND VOTuM 518 (2007).
57. See, e.g., Jtigen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State (Shierry
Weber Nicholsen trans.), in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 107, 108-
09 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) (pointing to the struggles democratic societies faced in order to gain recogni-
tion of their rights and the struggles of minority groups in democratic societies at the present who are fighting
to have their own rights recognized as well).
58. Habermas does not develop these matters at great length. What follows in this and the next para-
graph is my own account that, while not derived from Habermas's, is perfectly consistent with his views. See
generally Vlad Perju, Cosmopolitanism and Constitutional Self-Government, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L. 326 (2010).
59. Id. at 336.
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interpretation of freedom of religion or constitutional equality is very different from
the Italian interpretation, to take one example.6 Each system must rationalize for
itself that difference if it is to preserve its normative openness toward other
constitutional states. Glossing over nuance, assume that the most usual answer
explains variation as points on a spectrum of reasonable interpretations. For reasons
that could be labeled, in Rawlsian fashion, burdens of (institutional) judgment, and
which include particularities of historical development, different legal traditions, and
varying cultural backgrounds, each system gives specific-and, at the inter-systemic
level, conflicting-meanings to its broad, fundamental rights guarantees.6 ' This
explanation allows each state to perceive the other interpretations of common
guarantees as reasonable, even if different from its own.
Add to this the European supranational dimension and consider how each
municipal jurisdiction relates to the interpretation of rights at the supranational level
(leaving aside for the moment the problem of hierarchy). Supranational interpretation
would be a threat if it fell outside the range of reasonable interpretations. This could
not be because the protection of fundamental rights fell outside of the European
Union's goals or competencies, since the opposite has long been recognized.62 More
likely, the reason why supranational interpretation falls short has to do with the
importance of the task of securing the protection of fundamental rights to its self-
governing citizens, through certain procedures that all reasonable persons count as
fair, which is so momentous that each jurisdiction understandably seeks to preserve it
within its own jurisdiction. In the above example, the meaning of freedom of religion
is too important a matter of collective self-government to grant a transfer to the
supranational level.
This formulation, particularly the meaning of 'transfer,' might rub the reader as
vague. I will tighten it up shortly, but its vagueness helps to make the following point.
If the protection of fundamental rights is by definition superior within each national
jurisdiction, then national jurisdictions would be entitled to normative closure not only
from supranational protection, but also from other national jurisdictions. The
spectrum of reasonable interpretative positions would be reduced to the one
interpretation reached by the sovereign political community itself. My point is that if
citizens have rational grounds to fear the supranational level, those same grounds
would suggest that they should be fearful of one another. But a constitutional mindset
where each political community can only trust its own judgment is incompatible with
the normative openness that each constitutional state must display toward other
constitutional states. Conversely, if national jurisdictions within the EU can trust one
another, there is no reason to want to maintain the national level as the sole or final
60. See Malick W. Ghachem, Introduction: Symposium: Law, Religion, and Lautsi v. Italy, 65 ME. L.
REv. 755,756 (2013) (illustrating the differences between the interpretation of freedom of religion of France,
with laiitd-the French secular state-and Italy, i.e. with official state church); Omar G. Encamaci6n, Gay
Rights:
Why Democracy Matters, 25 J. DEM. 90,91(2014) (pointing to the differences of the legality of gay marriage
in France, where it is legal, and Italy, where it is not).
61. See Perju, supra note 58, for a more detailed account of my own approach on constitutional tradi-
tions and differences in constitutional cultures and doctrines.
62. Even before such protections were codified in the Treaties, both the European institutions and na-
tional constitutional courts acknowledged that fundamental rights are parts of the European legal order. See
BVerfGE 73, 339 2 BvR 197/83 Solange II-decision, Oct. 22, 1986.
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guarantor of any kind. For the same reasons they trust one another, they equally trust
the supranational level.
But what if a plurality of jurisdictions, by itself, enhances the protection of
fundamental rights? This familiar argument can take one of two forms, neither of
which is particularly convincing. First, a plurality of jurisdictions might offer an
additional safeguard for the protection of rights.6 3 In this view, supranational
delegation of the protection of fundamental rights leaves individuals vulnerable to the
risk of authoritarian abuse. But this argument restates the implicit preference for
nation-states that were identified in the previous section. That risk allocation requires
an account of why the likelihood of abuse is greater (and the protection from it is more
difficult) at the supranational level than at the national level. The argument that
European supranational institution, by design, create a form of politics that unleash
the forces of the market upon the defenseless citizens of the EU's member states is
one that has long defined left critiques of European integration." While sharing a keen
awareness of the political stakes, Habermas, to his credit, does not see the Union as
impervious to institutional reform. At the same time, it helps to keep in focus the
historical reality of European nation-states perpetrating a long string of vicious abuses
on their own citizens and any other subjects coming under their jurisdiction during the
long twentieth century.65 My point is that the superiority of nation-states as defenders
of rights cannot be taken for granted. As far as risk-gauging is concerned, there are
risks on both the national and supranational sides.
Another way of interpreting this argument is that a plurality of jurisdictions is
preferable since lateral communication within national constitutional orders leads to
improved understanding of the demands of rights. The advantage comes here from
the existence of a plurality of jurisdictions, with the implication that, if that plurality is
outpaced, as it would be if the supranational level were hierarchically superior, an
important correction mechanism becomes unavailable to national constitutional
democracies. This argument, I believe, is at best an exaggeration. Even under the
current system, where municipal jurisdictions engage in normative lateral
communication, final decisions about how to direct the coercive force of public
authority are made by municipal institutions. National judges remain the filter for all
decisions of authority. Furthermore, if the municipal institutions of the European
nation-states were to be united through some form of fusion, legal practice under the
newly created institutions could certainly find ways of translating the rich diversity of
the past. Arguably, fusion at the EU level would not need to monopolize the task of
right-interpretation from political units at the lower level. Structural allocations of
decision-making authority would be the object of political bargaining and
constitutional interpretation. And, while the plurality of national states would not
continue within the European structure, it would continue outside of it. Europe is not
63. See generally Frangois-Xavier Millet, The Respect for National Constitutional Identity in the Euro-
pean Legal Space: An Approach to Federalism as Constructionism, in THE QUESTION OF COMPETENCE IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION 253 (Loic Azoulai eds., 2014) (discussing the existence of legal pluralism in the
European Union between the Union itself and its member states).
64. For a recent, post-Brexit vote, statement of this position, see Richard Tuck, A Prize in Reach for the
Left (Jul. 17, 2017) (transcript available at https://policyexchange.org.uk/pxevents/brexit-a-prize-in-reach-
for-the-left/).
65. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES (2nd
ed. 2000) (detailing the abuses committed by European nation-states during the twentieth-century).
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the world, and there would be constitutional states in other parts of the world alongside
which the newly formed European political structure would coexist and to whose
experiences in self-government it would relate.
I have argued that the protection of fundamental rights at the European level is
no less out-of-range, at least a priori, than the protection afforded within different
national constitutional orders. This, one can object, might be true but it is still not
convincing as an account of why the members of a political community would endorse
and live by those alternative interpretations. Even if each political community
interprets the rights it protects in a way itself reasonable, supranational interpretation
is not their interpretation, that is, an interpretation over which the political community
assumes ownership. Democracy means self-government. In the same way that the
French are free to reject the German's interpretation of the right to freedom of opinion
as reasonable in itself but still different from the French, so the same would be true
about how members of a national political community would relate to the European
interpretation. What matters, in this view, is not objective reasonableness, but the self-
determination of a political community.
This is an important insight. But it is an insight about the importance of self-
determination, which should not replicate the normative asymmetry that tacitly
positions nation-states above the European Union in Habermas's account. Let me
explain. Consider the reconstruction of constitutional patriotism as an attachment to
constitutional culture. According to this view, which seeks to mediate between
universal norm and particular context, citizens form attachments to the "kinds of
conversations, controversies, and disagreements" that constitute the process of mutual
justification of the terms of collective self-government, including the interpretation of
rights." The abstract norms and principles of a political community become
appropriated as the norms of that specific community as they enter a public process of
meaning specification. So deep is that process that it ought to be called 'cultural,' and
so important it is that the process itself becomes the object of attachment for the
members of a political community. Now, this account may or may not be convincing
as an account of constitutional patriotism. But its relevance and force as an account
of constituent power, especially one that splits the identity of the sovereign, is a
separate matter. The difference has to do with taking the state for granted as an
existing political unit.7 This assumption of the state can be built-into the account of
constitutional culture as an account of constitutional patriotism, but its role cannot be
the same in the dual sovereignty account of constituent power. The task for citizens
in their supranational capacity is how to conceive of self-government at the European
level. With that question as the agenda for constituent power, failure of the constituent
process would be preordained if the process had to proceed from the premise of a thick
conception of constitutional culture within the existing political structure of the nation-
state. The self-constitution of the EU requires the constituent power to take up the
central task, which is the articulation of the normative foundations of the mechanisms
of self-determination at the supranational level. At that constitutive moment, and
given the task they have set for themselves, individuals ought to be free not to reject
placing the protection of rights, which I take to include not only the specific application
66. Jan-Werner Muller, A General Theory of Constitutional Patriotism, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 72, 82
(2008).
67. Id. at 89.
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of rights but also the cultural, deliberative processes of rights interpretation, at the
supranational level.
IV. REVISITING THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE: THE
SOZIALSTAAT
As members of their nation-states, individuals seek to protect the
accomplishments of the constitutional state. Securing the living conditions and
educational opportunities that are "preconditions for effective democratic
participation"' is one of the historical accomplishments of European states post-
World War II as they created systems of economic redistribution. It is a longstanding
critique of European integration that it poses a deadly threat to national welfare
projects on this front, which would stand no chance in the face of market forces
unleashed by supranational institutions." While, at first glance, it might look as if using
redistributive policies to preserve nation-states runs counter to Habermas's post-
metaphysical liberalism for pluralist societies," a better reading shows that at issue are
the deep foundations of redistribution, specifically the risk that the social bond
nurtured by the Sozialstaat's conception of autonomy would unravel once decoupled
from the institutional structure of the nation-state. Such a development would lead to
the "fragmentation of the care for the common good,"" and undermine the conditions
that make consideration of the public good a political necessity (and perhaps even an
option). The erosion of solidarity undercuts redistributive policies and can lead to the
demise of the European model of social integration. Individuals as citizens of their
nation-states understand that not any version of European integration is defensible,
and, accordingly, see the version that undercuts their states as guarantors of social
solidarity as one that should not be defended.'
One could, of course, find this development plausible and support the project of
European integration, as Hayek did,7 3 precisely for its capacity to unravel the thick
solidarity that supports material redistribution. But how should one less inimical to
redistributive policies relate to the project of European integration?
This is an important-and indeed pressing -question, as recent developments
make all-too-clear. Recall only the Irish and Portuguese bail-outs ('voluntary' in the
Inquisition sense of the word74 ) or Greece's crucifixion to the altar of austerity, to grasp
the magnitude of the risks of governance by "executive federalism."75 The risk is
68. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at 200 (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
69. See Habermas, Constitution, supra note 7, at 14 (explaining that Europe falls short of what is needed
for the kind of supranational decision-making that is already developed within the institutional framework
of the union).
70. See MORGAN, supra note 32, at 85-88 (examining the general argument for a welfare-based Euro-
pean political integration and that there is no reason Europeans ought to accept this type of welfare state).
71. ERNST-WOLFGANG BOCKENFORDE, Which Path is Europe Taking?, in CONSTITUTIONAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY: SELECTED WRITINGS 343, 351 (Mirjam Kinkler & Tine Stein eds., 2017).
72. See id. at 360 (discussing the difficulties of creating a unified European identity out of the European
Union).
73. See generally Friedrich Hayek, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 255-72 (1948)
74. See GAVIN HEwITT, THE LOST CONTINENT 246 (2013).
75. HABERMAS, CRISIS OFEU, supra note 1, at 12 (using the term executive federalism in contrast with
transnationalized democracy).
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compounded once these policies are interpreted against the background of the
remarkable accomplishments of the European postwar order. Social democracy
became a model in which society was neither "an adjunct to the market," as Karl
Polanyi had warned, nor were the market's liberating social effects stifled by
unmovable social structures. The result has been described as "the most successful
ideology and movement of the twentieth century: Its principles and policies
undergirded the most prosperous and harmonious period in European history by
reconciling things that hitherto seemed incompatible - a well-functioning capitalist
system, democracy and social stability."" The accomplishments of that political model
translated into constitutional goods now endangered by European integration.
Now, as far as dual sovereignty is concerned, the risks to social solidarity ought
to be assessed from the specific perspective of constituent power. And, it is important
not to gloss over nuances in how the social democratic model was supposed to work in
theory and how it actually worked in practice. One should especially not exaggerate
the levels of solidarity that European postwar nation-states have achieved. In his
earlier work, Habermas was rightly critical of nation-states on this front." Yet in
moving from the national to the supranational, he succumbs to reductionist tendencies.
The resource of his reductionism is not Habermas's propensity to operate with ideal
types, but rather the unbalanced idealizations that, I argue, end up imposing
unreasonable burdens on the supranational level. The dual sovereignty thesis makes
assumptions about redistribution and solidarity that are too demanding even for the
traditional nation-state to meet."
Consider Habermas's own account of how social solidarity came about within
nation-states. The dual sovereignty thesis describes circularly social solidarity as
created by welfare policies that themselves depend on the existence of a strong social
bond." This is a vicious circle that Habermas breaks through the formative role of
political institutions. Social integration and political integration are distinct
processes, and Habermas's work shows how the latter created the former in the
context of nation-states.' The implication is that one cannot bemoan the lack of social
solidarity if the political institutions necessary to bring it about are not in place.
Equally important, the existence of social solidarity should not be interpreted as the
natural or organic expression of a special society; but rather as the successful outcome
76. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF
OUR TIME 60 (2nd ed. 2001).
77. SHERI BERMAN, THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE MAKING OF
EUROPE'S TWENTIETH CENTURY 6 (2006).
78. See MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at 200-01 (pointing out Habermas's reliance on Foucault's critique
of bureaucratization and normalization in the Sozialstaat).
79. Id. at 288 ("Notwithstanding Habermas's best intentions and efforts, democracy in a supranational
age could never stand up to criteria derived from a democratic past that never existed.").
80. See ILSUP AHN, POSITION AND RESPONSIBILITY: JORGEN HABERMAS, REINHOLD NIEBUHR, AND
THE CO-RECONSTRUCTION OF THE POSITIONAL IMPERATIVE 111 (2009) ("Habermas argues that the
sources of social solidarity can only be available through the communicative practices of autonomous citi-
zens: 'The forces of social solidarity can be regenerated in complex societies only in the forms of communi-
cative practices of self-determination."').
81. See HABERMAS, TECHNOCRACY, supra note 1, at 38 ("[T]here is a widespread conviction that na-
tional citizens owe the fragile resource of free and relatively equitable living conditions to the democratic
practices and liberal institutions of their states.").
82. Id.
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of that society's political institutions' operation over time. Now, what is true at the
national level is also true at the supranational level.' The establishment of
supranational political institutions can precede the creation of the underlying
solidaristic social basis (including media of conmunication), or at least a lack of such
basis should not hamper the political institutional project.
More importantly, social welfare reveals another unresolved tension in the dual
sovereignty thesis. To see it, assume for now that nation-states have accomplished
(idealized) social solidarity within their borders and that this accomplishment together
with the related constitutional conception of the self are strong reasons why their
citizens wish their preservation, as well as the preservation of their own identity as
members, even after creating the EU. Having secured this constitutional good, nation-
states find themselves co-existing alongside the European Union. The harmonization
of the dual identity of sovereign individuals, who have co-originally created the two
levels of government, requires a certain normative continuity between the political and
constitutional structures of these two orders. Assume further that Habermas is right
about the Sozialstaat conception of autonomy within the former context ("no one is
free as long as the freedom of one person must be purchased with another's
oppression"'); then a version of the same would have to be the case in the European
context. Unless that is the case, harmonization processes between the two parts of
one's identity would prove difficult. But autonomy will develop this layer of
interdependence at the European level presumably only under conditions of social
solidarity that are different but still comparable to those in effect at the national level.
So, social solidarity would have to develop at both the national and European levels;
the very viability of the project of self-determination at either level would depend on
that development.
Now, Habermas is of course intensely well aware that the European
supranational project cannot succeed without transnational solidarity-which is to say
that European identity, as one dimension of the dual political identity, lacks viability
without the mechanisms to structure the supranational polity." His proposals for the
creation of a European public sphere attempt to create the institutional structure
where that form of solidarity can take root.' But the dual sovereignty thesis lacks the
insight that the simultaneous development of social solidarity at both levels is conflict-
ridden. If the material but, more importantly symbolic, resources from which
solidarity grows are limited, the relation between national and European projects is
likely to be closer to zero-sum. The point is that the very existence of nation-states (as
83. This assumes, correctly in my view, that solidarity and underlying trust does not depend on small
communities. See generally AXEL HONNETH, THE IDEA OF SOCIALISM 29 (2017) for a similar view.
84. HABERMAS, TEcHNOcRACY, supra note 1 at 39 (stating that national media needs to report on
issues of common concern to EU citizens, which will develop the current nationally limited civic solidarity
trust among EU citizens into one that reaches across national borders).
85. HABERMAS, FAcrs AND NORMS, supra note 23, at 418.
86. For a discussion, see AXEL HONNETH supra note 83, 99-103.
87. HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 23, at 502 (characterizing the present European politi-
cal sphere as fragmented and discussing the importance and likelihood of creating "an obligation towards
the European common good" in order to achieve transnational unification).
88. His proposals include, but are not limited to, the use of European media, the reform of European
institutions, and most importantly by disempowering the European Council and continuing to empower the
European Parliament. See generally id.
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equals to the supranational Europe) is an obstacle to transnational solidarity. For as
long as they will exist on equal footing with the supranational level, a state-of-affairs
to which dual sovereignty is committed, nation-states will claim license to act in ways
that will undermine the creation of sovereignty at the European level. Dual
sovereignty downplays and generally glosses over the existential tensions between the
two sovereigns because it is a severely depoliticized account." Yet as soon as one
replaces this distorting lens with one more attune to latent conflict, the current
configuration of the constitutional relations between the Union and its members
appears for what it is, namely the outcome of conflict. To take just one example, the
EU has failed to create its own budget through direct taxation not because it is a
supranational institution, but because nation-states mustered all their political
influence to prevent that development." If conflict such as this is inescapable, then
choices must be made between the national and supranational levels. To see how they
are made, and what they are, we turn to European constitutionalism.
V. THE LESSONS OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
European law holds the key to understanding the nature of the European project,
Habermas claims, as he deploys the principles of European constitutionalism -from
limited conferral to the requirement of unanimity in treaty amendments to the
protection of national constitutional identity- to shape the philosophical intuitions
behind dual sovereignty thesis.9' He interprets European constitutional doctrine to
reflect a heterarchical, not hierarchical, relation between municipal and supranational
law, which relate to each other as co-original and co-determinate equals.9 I argue in
this section that the principles on which Habermas relies are more ambiguous than he
claims. A more nuanced interpretation of European law provides at best tangential
support and, more often than not, undercuts the case for dual sovereignty.
One caveat is in order. While Habermas sees himself as a critic of the German
Constitutional Court, at least post-Maastricht, the dual sovereignty thesis is influenced,
if my interpretation of that thesis is correct, by the German court's theorizing of the
normative interface between municipal and European law. What Habermas criticizes
in the Maastricht decisions are the nationalist, organicist idea of political community
that had deep roots in German constitutional thought and which the Maastricht Court
endorses. That critique is certainly well taken.Y But at least an equally insidious point
of contention concerns the deep normative core of the German judges' jurisprudential
vision, which denies the European legal order the autonomy the supranational order
has claimed since the constitutionalization of the Treaty of Rome." That
89. See, e.g., Lindahl, supra note 41, at 494 (stating that one of the features that distinguishes the EU
from the US is that "European integration does not imply a zero-sum game: The presupposition of a Euro-
pean people, as the collective subject of the European legal order, does not exclude the presupposition of
European peoples, in the plural, as the collective subjects of national legal orders.")
90. See generally LUCA CERIONI, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND DIRECr TAXATION (2015)
91. See generally, HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 23.
92. See generally id.
93. See J. H. H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht
Decision, Eur. L. J., vol. 1 (3): 219-258 (1995).
94. On the constitutionalization of the Treaty of Rome, see J. H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of
Europe 100 Yale L. J. 2403 (1991).
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conceptualization has ushered in a nation-state centered approach to European
constitutionalism.' It is not by accident that Habermas does not take issue with this
conceptualization, which replicates the same kind of asymmetries that favor the
nation-state against the European Union as the dual sovereignty thesis itself.9 My aim
in this section is not to offer a comprehensive critique of that approach or to flesh out
an alternative account of European constitutionalism. Those are challenges for
another day. My study here is limited to select principles of European
constitutionalism invoked in connection to the dual sovereignty thesis.7
Front and center in Habermas's account is the principle of limited conferral of
powers.9 8 This principle limits EU legislative action to areas where nation-states
explicitly or implicitly authorized EU institutions to act and only for so long as and
until those states, either as a bloc or individually, do not withdraw such authority."
National constitutional courts, Germany's most prominently among them, have
pointed to limited conferral as evidence that nation-states have not given the EU a
constitutional blank check.1 O0 This reading is correct insofar as, formally speaking, the
powers of the EU institutions are limited and subject to oversight." But it helps to
recall that limited conferral is a principle that structures the relation between the
federal center and the constitutive states or provinces in typical federations. The EU
is in this sense like all other such structures, which is to say that the principle of limited
conferral is consistent with a logic of hierarchy of precisely the type that Habermas
rejects in the European constitutional context.10
95. See generally Julio Baquero Cruz, The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralism Movement,
14 EUR. L. J. 389 (2008), for an account of the German Constitutional Court's role in establishing the na-
tional-constitutional approach to European integration.
96. As late as 2007, Habermas compared the European Union to an international organization. See gen-
erally Habermas, supra note 56, at 518. For an explanation of his views in terms of intellectual biography,
see STEFAN MULLER-DOOHM, HABERMAS: A BIOGRAPHY 356 (2016) (discussing Habermas's initial ap-
proach to European integration as primarily an economic organization). This changes by 2011, when he
describes the task at hand as the development of an international community of states into a cosmopolitan
community of states and world citizens. See generally HABERMAS, CRISIS OF EU, supra note 1, at xi.
97. This is, however, prolegomena to the larger descriptive case against constitutional pluralism. Neil
Walker is, I believe, correct that a frontal challenge to pluralist accounts of European constitutionalism
would have to include just such a descriptive dimension. See generally Neil Walker, supra note 32, at 346.
98. See generally HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 23.
99. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5 (2), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326),
18 [hereinafter TEU] ("Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein.
Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States."). For a recent
study, see generally THE QUESTION OF COMPETENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Loic Azoulai ed., 2014).
100. Limited conferral has been useful at the discursive level as an argument against the autonomy of
the European legal order. Theorists have used limited conferral to argue that, formally speaking, European
law derives all authority from conferral by its member states. As Kirchhof explains, "[t]he basis for the
validity of European law in Germany is the German Assenting Act. European law reaches Germany as an
area of application only across the bridge of the national Assenting Act. Where that bridge does not convey
this European law, it cannot, in Germany at any rate, develop any degree of legal force." Paul Kirchhof,
The Balance of Powers between National and European Institutions, 5 EUR. L. J. 225, 226 (1999).
101. See id. ("European law becomes binding through the conclusion of the Treaty by the parties to it
and by the issue of the command to obey the law through the parliamentary Assenting Act in each Member
State.").
102. HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 23, at 168-93.
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The interpretation and application of limited conferral are also important in this
context. The German Constitutional Court understandably inquired, in the Maastricht
judgment, whether supranational delegation in the European context is structured in
a "manner sufficiently foreseeable to ensure that the principle [of limited conferral] is
observed . . . ."' Surprising was its conclusion that the EU competencies indeed met
that foreseeability threshold.' Interpreted against the background of decades of EU
constitutional practice, that conclusion reveals how useful a fiction the principle of
limited conferral has been. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to offer a plausible
interpretation of European constitutionalism, at least during the pre-Maastricht
period, in which the application of limited conferral could be qualified as "sufficiently
foreseeable." 0o During that period, the European Commission consistently used the
Treaty of Rome's open-ended provisions as well as the "necessary powers" grant
liberally.'" The European Court of Justice endorsed that approach and, until well into
the 1990s, it turned down just about every invitation to invalidate secondary legislation
as ultra vires.o' Far from the neat demarcation one might expect if the application of
limited conferral were indeed sufficiently foreseeable, one commentator noted in the
mid-1990s that "[t]here is no issue area that was the exclusive domain of national policy
in 1950 and that has not somehow and to some degree been incorporated within the
authoritative purview of the EC/EU."'"
Of course, one should not exaggerate this point. The issue here is not an exact
tally of the division of competencies as much as the constitutional dynamic of
allocation. Consider the well-known case of fundamental rights. Relying on pre-
Maastricht case-law of the Italian and German Constitutional Courts, Habermas finds
support for dual sovereignty in the decisions of national judges to retain jurisdiction
over secondary European legislation falling short of the fundamental rights granted by
national constitutions." The exercise of residual sovereignty by national courts
qualified the European Court's claim to supremacy and, it is said, revealed the
"necessarily bi-directional" nature of the doctrine of European supremacy."o This
103. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, 89
ENTSHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 155, 171 (Ger.)
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 308, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325). See also
JOSEPH WErLER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?" AND
OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 55 n. 120 (1999) (discussing how the Community institutions
made liberal use of this provision as the legal basis for legislative measures).
107. See R. Daniel Kelemen, On the Unsustainability of Constitutional Pluralism: European Supremacy
and the Survival of the Eurozone, 23 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 136, 140 (2016) (mentioning case-
law in the Court of Justice holding that EU law has supremacy over national law).
108. Philippe C. Schmitter, Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts, in
GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 121, 124 (Gary Marks et al. eds., 1999). See also Koen Lenaerts,
Constitutionalism and the Many Face of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 220 (1990) (arguing that there
is "no nucleus of sovereignty that the Member States can invoke, as such, against the Community.").
109. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974, 37
ENTSHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 271, 285 (Ger.) [hereinafter Solange
I-Beschlu8]; Frontini, Sentenza n. 183, 18th December 1973 (Italian Constitutional Court).
110. Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism, 1 Y. B.
EUR. L. 267, 275 (1982) ("One dimension [of supremacy] is the elaboration of the parameters of the doctrine
by the European Court. But its full reception, the second dimension, depends on its incorporation into the
constitutional orders of the Member States and its affirmation by their supreme courts."); see also Bruno de
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interpretation, however, toes the line of the not-entirely-disinterested national courts,
eager to claim before their domestic audiences the power over EU doctrine."' Even in
the case of German reception, on which Habermas relies, it helps to recall that, under
both Solange I and II, the German Constitutional Court acquiesced to the European
Court's doctrine that the European legal order is autonomous. Only post-Maastricht
did the German constitutional judges reverse their own precedent, denying the claim
to special status of the Europe-an legal order and adopting a national constitutional
standpoint from which EU supranational law had to be conceptualized within the
framework of international law. The German judges sought to hide the radicalism of
their reactionary approach by re-writing constitutional history. They claimed, contrary
to established European doctrine, that human rights were absent from the genesis of
the European legal order and presumably had to be transplanted from elsewhere, such
as from municipal law. The implication of the need for such imports was to undercut
the normative viability of European constitutionalism standing alone, and to support
the view that European constitutionalism cannot threaten the autonomy of national
jurisdictions on whose existence it depends."2
But, one could argue, whatever the correct interpretation of the human rights
saga, doesn't the ultra vires review under the Maastricht decision and identity review
under the Lisbon decision. give Habermas sufficient ammunition to make the case
about the dual nature of sovereignty as a matter of European constitutional law? What
matters, in this view, is not how often national courts used their powers to review
European legislation, but rather the fact that they gave themselves these powers in
their first place-and that their activation depends on their will. The sword of
Damocles does its work while hanging in the air. Perhaps so. But what danger comes
from a sword that has, until very recently, never fallen and which often seemed too
heavy to hold up in the air indefinitely? It cannot be irrelevant that, in over six decades
of the practice of European constitutionalism, only a handful of cases show national
courts challenging the authority of the European Union. 114 The point is that, should
such challenges become more common, that change would amount to a paradigm shift
away from the past version of European constitutionalism and toward another vision.
Perhaps dual sovereignty captures the new paradigm. What it does not capture,
however, is existing European constitution practice.
Witte, Direct Effect, Primacy and the Nature of the European Legal Order, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW
323, 351 (Grdinne de BCrca & Paul Craig eds., 2nd ed. 2011) ("There is therefore a second dimension to the
[primacy] matter, which is decisive for determining whether the Court's doctrines have an impact on legal
reality: the attitude of national courts and other institutions.").
111. See also G. Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Democracy and the European Court of Justice,
57 MOD. L. REV. 157, 187 (1994) ("It would be an exaggeration to say that the European Court was bull-
dozed into protecting fundamental rights by rebellious national courts.").
112. For an extended version of this argument, see Vlad Perju, Uses and Misuses of Human Rights in
European Constitutionalism, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND LEGITIMACY IN A WORLD IN
DISORDER (Silja Vdneky & Gerald L. Neuman eds., 2018).
113. BVERFG, JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND SENATE OF 30 JUNE 2009-2 BvE 2/08.
114. See Case C-399/09, Marie Landtovd v. CeskA sprAva socialniho zabezpetenf, 2011 E.C.R 1-05573 (a
European Court of Justice case originating from the Czech Constitutional Court); see also Jan KomArek,
Czech Constitutional Court Playing with Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court Declares a Judgment of
the Court of Justice of the EU Ultra Vires, 8 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 323 (2012) (analyzing the significance of
a subsequent judgment by the Czech Constitution Court on February 14, 2012 that declared the previously
mentioned European Court of Justice opinion to be an ultra vires act).
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It is perhaps possible to interpret Habermas's account as evidence that such a
shift is underway. Take, for instance, the protection of national identity as evidence
of underlying dual sovereignty."' At issue here is the explicit commitment that EU
institutions have taken, as early as the Treaty of Maastricht but in a fuller form in the
Treaty of Lisbon, to commit the national identity of its member states."' This provision
has been interpreted to show the co-existence as equals of the municipal and European
legal orders."' An alternative interpretation seems to me more defensible. In this
alternative interpretation, constitutional identity is consistent with a hierarchical
model of constitutionalism. First, as a matter of constitutional doctrine, national
identity receives recognition when-and, arguably, precisely because-it coexists
along other doctrines of European constitutionalism that neutralize it. For instance,
the values mentioned in Article 2 TEU, which Europeanizes the basic constitutional
structures of the EU member states, restrict the reach of national identity."" Secondly,
the effect of incorporating the protection of constitutional identity into the Treaty is
to make that identity a concept of EU law. This opens the door for the ECJ to define
the boundaries of national identity, in the same way that the Luxembourg judges have
always invoked the effectiveness of EU law to impose a unified meaning over concepts
such as goods, persons, workers, disability and the like."'
There is pressure for the ECJ to move in that direction. The Hungarian
constitutional court, having been captured by the Orbdn regime and transformed from
a defender of constitutional democracy into an effective political tool in Hungary's
authoritarian turn, recently invoked the doctrine of national identity to challenge the
supremacy of European law.'20 Given the equally troublesome developments in
Poland, one can foresee decisions of national judges invoking the Polish national
identity as a limit to the effect of primary or secondary European legislation. Quite
apart from how the EU's will answer to such challenges, these examples show how
troubling it is to find Habermas's invocation of national identity as constitutional
doctrine that supports the normative appeal of the dual sovereignty thesis.
I do not mean to suggest that all invocations of constitutional identity are as
malign as those mentioned before. In jurisdictions where the foundations of
115. See Habermas, Democracy in Europe, supra note 1, at 556 (discussing citizens' dual identities as
citizens of the EU and citizens of their nation); Solange I-Beschlu8, supra note 109.
116. TEU, supra note 99, art 4(2).
117. See, e.g., Leonard F.M. Besselink, National and Constitutional Identity Before and After Lisbon, 6
UTRECHT L. REv. 36, 48 (2010) (remarking that "the provision of Article 4(2) EU forms an important qual-
ification of the rule on the primacy of EU law, and a modification of the case law under Costa v. ENEL.").
118. TEU, supra note 99, art. 2.
119 But see Monica Claes and Jan-Herman Reestman, The Protection of National Constitutional Identity
and the Limits of European Integration at the Occasion of the Gauweiler Case, 16 GERMAN L. J. (4): 917-
970 (2015) (discussing the tensions between national and constitutional identity at the national and supra-
national levels in the context of the German Constitutional Court's OMT decision).
120. See Alkotm~nybfr6sdg (AB) [Constitutional Court], Nov. 11, 2016, AK X/03327/2015 (Hung.)
(holding, citing Solange, that it "cannot set aside the ultima ratio protection of human dignity and the es-
sential content of fundamental rights, and it must [ensure that the EU law] not result in violating human
dignity or the essential content of fundamental rights."). Under Article E (2) of the Hungarian Constitution,
"the joint exercising of a competence shall not violate Hungary's sovereignty (sovereignty control), and on
the other hand it shall not lead to the violation of constitutional identity (identity control)." Id. para. 54. For
an early analysis see GAbor Halmai, The Hungarian Constitutional Court and Constitutional Identity,
VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Jan. 10, 2017), http://verfassungsblog.de/the-hungarian-constitutional-court-and-con-
stitutional-identity/.
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constitutional democracy are-at least arguably-under attach, national courts, now
empowered to protect national identity, have been rather flummoxed by the task of
spelling out the elements of their constitutional identity.12' The elements they have
subsumed under the rubric of identity- "inalienable human rights"'2 2 or "the rule of
law"'23-are trite and strategically articulated at high level of abstraction. The one
clear exception from this trend has been the German Constitutional Court. In its
Lisbon judgment, the Court drew red lines over what areas ought to remain within the
exclusive competence of the German Staat.12 ' It is too soon to tell if the effectiveness
of "identity review" will have to be as qualified as that of the Maastricht-era "ultra
vires review. "2 Regardless, the protection of national identity hardly provides support
for the dual identity thesis. As the German origins show, the principle makes the
European legal order derivative of national law, rather than co-original. And that
derivative nature is no accident; it is normatively continuous with the logic of
constitutional identity.
Two other doctrines of European constitutionalism should be briefly discussed.
The first is the requirement of consensus among member states for changes to the
Treaties.126 Habermas points out that, unlike in the United States, where under the
terms of Article V a majority (not unanimity) of states must approve constitutional
amendments, all EU member states must ratify constitutional changes.127 States retain
a veto over treaty changes, which Habermas sees as evidence of heterarchy.128 That
interpretation is questionable. What Habermas calls amendments are, formally
speaking, new treaties. 129 And, as new treaties, they must be valid under international
law, which, details asidel", grounds obligation in the consent of each state-party. While
there remains a difference if one compared that system to the US's, that difference is
121. See Armin Von Bogdandy & Stephan Schill, Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National
Identity under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1417, 1440 (2011) (discussing how most domes-
tic constitutional courts' decisions related to constitutional limits are vague).
122. Id. at 1436.
123. Ostavnf soud tesk6 republiky 8.3.2006, (OS) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of March 8,
2006], sp.zn. OS 50/04; Ostavnf soud Cesk6 republiky 3.5.2006, (OS) [Decision of the Constitutional Court
of May 3, 2006], sp.zn. U 66/04. For a French example, see generally Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitu-
tional Court] decision No. 2006-540, July 27, 2006, (Fr.). In later cases, the Czech court refused to list non-
transferable competencies or identify a core of the constitution. See generally Ostavnf soud tesk6 repub-
liky 3.11.2009, (OS) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of Nov. 3, 2009], sp.zn. OS 29/09.
124. BVERFG, 2 BvE 2/08, June 30, 2009 ("[p]articularly sensitive for the ability of a constitutional state
to democratically shape itself are decisions on substantive and formal criminal law (1), on the disposition of
the monopoly on the use of force by the police within the state and by the military towards the exterior (2),
fundamental fiscal decisions on public revenue and public expenditure, the latter being particularly moti-
vated, inter alia, by social policy considerations (3), decisions on the shaping of living conditions in a social
state (4) and decisions of particular cultural importance, for example on family law, the school and education
system and on dealing with religious communities (5).").
125. See Kelemen, supra note 107, at 149 (examining existing and possible future approaches to "identity
review" and "ultra vires review").
126. Habermas, supra note 16, at 340.
127. HABERMAS, CRISIS OF EU, supra note 1, at 40.
128. HABERMAS, TECHNOCRACY, supra note 1, at 36-40.
129. HABERMAS, CRISIS OF EU, supra note 1, at 24.
130. See generally Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy of International Law, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2
(2013) for a similar argument.
732018]
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
a function of the particular historical trajectory by which the EU came about as an
international organization created by sovereign states under international law. 3'
Similarly, one should be cautious about interpreting Lisbon now-famous Art. 50
TEU, which gives member states the option of exiting the EU, as evidence of dual
sovereignty at work.32 How much residual sovereignty the departing member state
must have or be willing to use in the exercise of Article 50 is a matter of constitutional
politics and constitutional legal design whose clarification must await the unfolding of
the Brexit saga. By unfolding I mean not only the UK's vote in favor of exit but also
the negotiations, the exit itself (if it happens) and the impact on the UK of its exit from
the European Union. At a general level, however, it helps to separate contingent from
necessary structural features. In some federations, secession rules are court-made.
In the EU, the masters of the Treaty intervened (noticeably late, in the Constitutional
Treaty and then through the Art. 50 of the Reform Treaty) to fill in a space that the
ECJ had not claimed for itself." The reason for the ECJ's silence is path-dependent:
Historically, the ECJ has been reluctant to use heightened scrutiny in reviewing the
grand institutional bargains between Brussels and the member states.35
I have interpreted constitutional principles in light of constitutional practice, and
it might be argued that principles themselves are important in the articulation of a
philosophical project of constituent power such as Habermas's. I do not think this line
of argument is strong. First, and ironically, because one of the grand lessons of
Habermas's overall body of work is that the theory and the practice should not be
hermetically separated.'" The strength of the theory is that it fits the practice; if it does
not, then another theory must be chosen. If the dual sovereignty thesis does not fit the
practice of European constitutionalism, then different -and, as it happens, bolder -
accounts of supranational constituent power should be sought. It is not a counter-
argument to this position that dual sovereignty is a rational reconstruction, which
offers an idealized account of European constitutional practice. First, dual sovereignty
is not hardly an ideal theory. Second, dual sovereignty is presented as a 'best
131. In addition, qualified majority, not unanimity, is in many areas the voting rule for secondary legis-
lation, some of which can claim quasi-constitutional stature.
132. TEU, supra note 99, art. 50.
133. This is the case in federations such as the U.S. and Canada. For an analysis, see generally Sujit
Choudhry & Nathan Hume, Federalism, Devolution and Secession: From Classical to Post-Conflict Federal-
ism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 356 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind
Dixon eds., 2011).
134. See Mancini & Keeling, supra note 111, at 175-87.
135. One recalls in this context the Court's unwillingness to rule on the Luxembourg Compromise
(1966), which allowed states to preserve their veto rights in the Council, in violation of the Treaty of Rome.
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interpretation' of the normative principles of European constitutionalism. In
Habermas's view, distilling the normative theory behind constitutional practice helps
to clarify the transnationalization of democracy in the European context and to justify
much-needed institutional reforms.13 7 But that clarification will not be forthcoming if
dual sovereignty downplays, as I have argued that it does, the radicalism of European
constitutionalism.
CONCLUSION
"Thought completes action," Hannah Arendt wrote.m' European integration
remains in need of normative models to capture the accomplishments of the European
political project and to redirect its future development. Dual sovereignty is a wrong
step in the right direction. The direction convincingly identifies constituent power as
not only far from obsolete, but in fact indispensable for the project of
transnationalizing democracy. That insight, however, is undercut by placing
supranational alongside national constituent power. Ultimately, the model it offers
caves under its own tensions and, politically, ends up legitimizing projects that
undermine European unification.
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